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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) . The Utah Court of
Appeals has no original appellate jurisdiction from the District
Courts under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2).

The Supreme Court has

exercised its discretion to transfer this case to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether the trial court violated Plaintiffs' substantive

due process rights when it failed to analyze the relevant elements
to determine whether to dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action with
prejudice.

The appellate court reviews the decision of the trial

court as a question of law and gives no deference to the decision
of the trial court, reviewing for correctness. State v. Vijil, 784
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988).
II.

Whether

the trial

court abused

its discretion by

dismissing Plaintiffs7 cause of action for failure to prosecute.
A trial court's determination to dismiss for failure to prosecute
is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.

Hartford

Leasing Co. v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994) . An appellate
court will not interfere with the trial court's decision unless the
trial court abused its discretion and there is a likelihood that
prejudice has occurred. Charlie Brown Construction Co. v. Leisure
1

Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987); Department of Social
Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs

brought

this

action

against

Defendants

to

immediately regain possession of Plaintiffs7 accounting records
which were inappropriately held by Defendants.

Plaintiffs also

alleged tortious interference with business relationship, damage to
Plaintiffs' ongoing businesses because of the deprivation of the
records, accounting malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and
punitive damages. Defendants' Answer alleged that the records had
been returned pursuant to an agreement between counsel and denied
the other allegations.
B.

Course of Proceedings
Discovery

appearances

for

was

undertaken

both

and

parties.

A

several
motion

attorneys
by

made

Plaintiffs

to

consolidate this action with another pending action common to the
parties was denied.
witnesses pursuant

Plaintiffs designated their expert and lay
to the Scheduling Order of May 19, 1993.

Defendants failed to designate any witnesses.

Plaintiffs filed a

motion to amend their complaint, which motion remains outstanding.
Trial was set for January 4, 1993, but later stricken by consent of
the parties and the judge.
A

scheduling

conference,

held

September

27,

1994, was

continued without date by the court on the stipulation of the
2

parties.

At this scheduling conference, Roger Sandack, attorney

for Defendants, indicated that he would likely withdraw.
Rokich determined

Judge

that it would be inappropriate to enter a

scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was changing.

Judge

Rokich indicated that he would take no further action on the case
until substitute counsel was named.
Substitute counsel for Defendants made his appearance on May
31, 1995, and filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice under Rule
41(b) along with his Notice of Appearance. Plaintiffs responded to
the

Motion

to

Dismiss

and

after

hearings,

memoranda,

objections, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted.

and
Roger

Sandack did not withdraw until July 3, 1995.
C.

Disposition of the Trial Court
The Trial Court, the Honorable William B. Bohling, District

Judge, presiding, granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on October
23, 1995, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
the same date. Notice of Appeal was filed on November 20, 1995 and
the Docketing Statement was filed on December 11, 1995.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 9, 1993, a scheduling hearing was conducted by the
Honorable John A. Rokich.

R. 91.

At that hearing, Judge Rokich

scheduled a pre-trial conference for November 30, 1993, scheduled
a five day trial beginning January 4, 1994, and set the deadlines
for designating expert and lay witnesses. R. 92. Plaintiffs filed
their designation of expert witnesses on August 27, 1993, R. 98-9,
3

and named their lay witnesses on September 30, 1993.

R. 100-03.

Defendants filed no list of witnesses.
Between
November

the June

30, 1993

9,

1993

Pre-trial

Scheduling Conference

Conference,

Plaintiffs

and the
undertook

discovery, issued subpoenas, and took record depositions. R.105116.

On November 17, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the

Complaint, R. 117, an Amended Complaint, R. 118, and a Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Amend the
Complaint.

R. 127-128.

At the November 30, 1993 Pre-trial

Conference, Judge Rokich and counsel for the parties agreed that
the trial scheduled for January 4, 1994 should be stricken and
continued without date.

R. 147.

A scheduling conference was held on September 27, 1994.

At

that hearing Defendant's attorney, Roger Sandack, informed the
court that he would withdraw as counsel for Defendants. Affidavit
of Judge Rokich, R. 306-07, Addendum 3. Judge Rokich continued the
scheduling conference, without date, so that Mr. Sandack could be
replaced without jeopardizing any scheduling established by the
court.

Id. Based on the disclosures of Mr. Sandack, Judge Rokich

determined that it would be inappropriate to enter a scheduling
order when Defense counsel was changing.

JEd.

Judge Rokich

intended to enter a scheduling order only after Defendant's new
counsel had been designated.

Id.

He also intended to take no

further action in relation to this case until substitute counsel
for Defendants made an appearance.

Id.

Judge Rokich retired and

his caseload was assumed by Judge Bohling.
4

On June 2, 1995, Defendant's new counsel, Michael L. Deamer,
simultaneously filed his Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel,
R. 183-84, and Notice to Dismiss with Prejudice Under Rule 41(b).
R. 185-86.

Roger Sandack withdrew as counsel for Defendants on

July 3, 1995.

R. 248-9.

Judge Bohling heard arguments on the

Motion to Dismiss on August 14, 1995, R. 334-41, and October 23,
1995, R. 342-53, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, R. 317-20, and entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on
October 23, 1995.

R. 321-23.

November 20, 1995.

R. 328-29.

The Notice of Appeal was filed

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Due process is a constitutionally guaranteed protection for
all

citizens.

Procedural

due

process

requires

that

every

individual receive notice and an opportunity for a hearing on all
pending
consider

issues.
relevant

Substantive due process requires
factors

in reaching

judges to

their decisions, thus

protecting against arbitrariness and abuses of discretion.

The

trial court failed to consider the relevant factors in making its
decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action with prejudice,
focusing only on the actions of Plaintiffs, rather than on the
actions

of both parties

and the prejudice

resulting

from a

dismissal.

The appropriate exercise of discretion requires the

disciplined

examination of the relevant

conjunction with each other.

factors, weighted in

Having failed to consider the

relevant factors, Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights have
been violated, and the case should be reversed and remanded to the
5

trial court.
Westinahouse sets forth five specific considerations that must
be reviewed by the court before ruling on a motion to dismiss.
These considerations are (1) the conduct of both parties, (2) the
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward, (3) what
each party did to move the case forward, (4) what difficulty or
prejudice was caused to the opposing party, and most importantly,
(5) whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
court

failed

Plaintiffs

to

cause

consider
of

these

action,

elements

which

before

constitutes

The trial
dismissing

an

abuse

of

discretion.
An additional factor in Westinghouse requires a "justifiable
excuse" for the delay.

On November 30, 1993, the Defendants

requested that the trial be continued, the parties agreed to
continuance, and Judge Rokich gave his blessing. At the September
27, 1994 scheduling conference, Defendants informed the court that
their

counsel would withdraw

counsel.

and

they would

name

substitute

Judge Rokich ruled that no action would be taken on the

case until Defendants named their successor attorney.

Defendants

chose to wait nine months before designating their new counsel.
Defendants, therefore, directly caused or consented to delays of
over 19 months. The Defendants' actions constitute the justifiable
excuse for the actions of Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs

adhered

to

designating

its witnesses.

witnesses.

Plaintiffs

the

court's

Defendants

conducted
6

scheduling
never

discovery,

order

designated
held

by
any

records

depositions, issued subpoenas duces tecum, and filed a Motion to
Amend Complaint.

Defendants did nothing to move the case forward

and now complain of the delay that they themselves created.

The

totality

the

of

the

circumstances

justify

the

reversal

of

dismissal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY NOT ANALYZING
EACH ELEMENT OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARD BEFORE
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE
Article 1, §11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this state, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
This provision

is commonly

referred

to as the

"open courts

provision", which guarantees the citizens of Utah access to the
courts of this State and a judicial procedure that is based on
fairness and equality.

See, Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717

P.2d 670 (Utah 1995) . Judicial interpretation of the open courts
provision finds that it embodies substantive due process rights and
freedom from arbitrary judicial rulings that deprive individual
claimants of the right of access to the courts.

See, Lee v.

Gaufin, 867 P. 2d 572 (Utah 1993) (Justice Zimmerman concurring
opinion).

While most due process cases concern the procedural due

process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard,
7

substantive due process concerns the content of the rules that
specify when a right can be lost or impaired. Wells v. Children's
Aid Soc.

681 P. 2d 199

(Utah 1984) .

Questions that trigger

substantive due process concerns can arise in the context of a
hearing where the procedural formalities of notice and opportunity
to be heard are observed but the ultimate decision is arbitrary,
capricious or fundamentally unfair. See, State v. Parker, 872 P.2d
1041, 1948 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . As this court observed in Parker:
. . . While notice and an opportunity to be heard
must be observed in order to meet the requirements of
procedural due process, . . . the opportunity to be
fairly heard is just one of the requisites of due
process. . . .
By limiting due process protection to
simply notice and a hearing, the dissent construes the
concept of due process too narrowly. "The purpose of due
process is to prevent fundamental unfairness." . . .
Furthermore,
although
seldom
utilized,
[s]ubstantive due process guarantees that no person
shall be deprived of
property for arbitrary
reasons." [citations omitted]
11

As recognized in Utah, the open courts provision and the
concept of substantive due process embodied

therein protects

claimants against arbitrary government action whether that action
is taken by the legislature or the judiciary.
Aircraft Corp. , Ill

See, Berry v. Beech

P. 2d at 670, 675 ("Both [section 11 and the due

process cause of Article 1, Section 7] act to restrict the powers
of both the courts and the legislature.")

Arbitrary judicial

action may occur when the courts fail to follow their precedent and
standards

in

rendering

their

decisions.

Precedent

creates

substantive law and the failure of the trial court to consider the
factors set forth in the substantive law allows arbitrary and
8

capricious decisions.

To avoid an arbitrary decision, this Court

reviews the dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute by the
"abuse of discretion" standard.
The abuse of discretion standard focuses on the way courts
analyze and render their decisions.

The cases that examine the

abuse of discretion standard uniformly require that courts analyze
the relevant factors before a decision is rendered. In the area of
alimony, this Court in Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah
App. 1993), stated:
considered
award:

[T]hree factors . . . must be
in fixing a reasonable alimony

[1] the financial conditions and needs of
the [spouse seeking support];
[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking
support] to produce a sufficient income for
[himself or] herself; and
[3] the ability of the [payor spouse] to
provide support.
Jones Tv. Jones1, 700 P.2d [1072,] 1075 [(Utah 1985)].
"Failure to consider the Jones factors in fashioning
an alimony award constitutes an abuse of discretion."
Bell fv. Belli. 810 P.2d [489,] 492 [(Utah App.
1991)](citations omitted) Thus, "the trial court must
make sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to
enable a reviewing court to
ensure that the trial
court/s discretionary determination was rationally based
upon" the three Jones factors. Id. (citations omitted).
"If sufficient findings are not made/ we must reverse
unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as to
allow us to apply the Jones factors as a matter of law on
appeal." Id. (Citation omitted)[Emphasis added].
The pertinent factors must be considered by the trial court before
a decision can be rendered.

Failure to consider the relevant

factors as set forth in the appellate opinions is an abuse of
9

discretion.

The trial court's findings must be sufficiently-

detailed on each factor to ensure that its determination is based
upon the analysis of relevant factors. If sufficient findings are
not made, the case must be reversed and remanded.
Analyzing the relevant factors before rendering a decision is
the protection against arbitrary and capricious decisions and the
guarantee of effective review.

If a court fails to consider the

relevant factors and make detailed findings based on those factors,
the appellate court cannot review the trial court's decision and
the case must be reversed and remanded.

The Utah Supreme Court in

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) stated:
[W] e hold that if reasonable fees are
recoverable by contract or statute and the trial court
considers all pertinent factors and determines in the
exercise of its sound discretion that a specific sum is
a reasonable fee, it is a mistake of law to award less
than that amount. Stated another way, the trial court
has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a
reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination
against an abuse-of-discretion standard. However, once
the trial court makes that determination in the exercise
of its sound discretion, it commits legal error if it
awards less than the reasonable fee to which the
successful litigant is entitled.
. . . Such an award would constitute an abuse of
discretion because the factors mentioned by the trial
court in discounting the fee, as outlined by Justice
Howe, are without support in the record or are otherwise
inappropriate. [Emphasis added].
Regardless of the decision being made, the pertinent factors must
be considered for the court to exercise its sound discretion.

If

the judgment is based upon factors not supported in the record or
inappropriately considered, the court has abused its discretion.
In the criminal law, sentencing requires the court to balance
10

the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before sentencing
a convict.

In State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App.

1993), this Court stated:
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless
the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a
sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits. . . .
[T]he supreme court stated that an "abuse of discretion
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing
were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a
'clearly excessive' sentence. [Emphasis added].
Failure of the trial court to consider all legally relevant factors
constitutes an abuse of discretion and requires reversal of that
court's decision.
In Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather. 605 P.2d 1240
(Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated:
The general rule which this Court follows is the
judgment of the trial court will not be reversed unless
it is shown the discretion exercised has been abused. In
arriving at his conclusion the trial judge considered
several factors relevant to the amount and composition of
the jury award.
The trial court's decision was not
arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, this Court will
not alter it.
The

trial

court's

decision

in

Ute-Cal

was

not

arbitrary,

capricious, or an abuse of discretion because the court considered
the relevant factors before making its decision.
In the context of the present case, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that the trial court's discretion in dismissing a pending
action must be balanced against the higher priority of affording a
claimant an opportunity to be heard and the need to do justice.
See, Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul Larsen Contractor.
Inc. , 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) .
11

In Westinghouse, the Court

stated that there is more to consider in determining if a dismissal
for failure to prosecute is proper than merely the amount of time
elapsed since the suit was filed.
factors

include;

(1) the

Id. at 879.

conduct

of both

Those additional
parties;

(2) the

opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) what
each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and
(5) most
dismissal.

important,

whether

injustice

may

result

from

the

Id.

The Findings and Conclusions entered by the trial court
evidence that the decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint was
based

exclusively

upon

the

court's

determination

that

the

Plaintiffs had not pressed forward with the prosecution of the
case.

In addition to the trial court's failure to analyze the

facts against the Westinghouse factors, the trial court's myopic
focus upon the Plaintiffs' actions constitutes a violation of
Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights because it failed to
even consider the factors necessary to render a decision.

Having

failed to consider the Westinghouse factors, the trial court's
decision is a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court's refusal
to consider the actions of the Defendants, including their request
and consent to the continuation of the trial and failure to name
replacement counsel for nine months, renders its decision contrary
to both the Westinghouse directive and any general notion of
fundamental fairness.
This case was scheduled for trial on January 4, 1994. R. 91.
12

At the November 30, 1993 Pretrial Hearing, Defendants sought a
continuance because they were unprepared to go forward with the
trial. The trial was continued without date. At the September 27,
1994 Scheduling Conference, Defendants' attorney, Roger Sandack
represented that he would be replaced by subsequent counsel and
therefore, would not be Defendants7 trial counsel.

But for the

actions of Defendants, this case would have been tried before Judge
Rokich in January, 1994.

The trial court ignored Defendants'

conduct and the delay of almost nineteen months it caused. Rather
than focus on the factors necessary in deciding a motion to
dismiss: the conduct of both parties, the opportunity of each party
to move the case forward, the actions taken by each party to move
the case forward, and the prejudice to each party, as required by
Westinahouse, the trial court focused exclusively upon the actions
of Plaintiffs.

In so doing, the court breached Plaintiffs7

substantive due process rights.

The trial court's refusal to

consider and weigh the Defendants7 contribution to the delay in
prosecution of this case constitutes a failure to adequately
consider material, relevant factors and causes the trial court's
exercise of discretion to be arbitrary and capricious.

See, Ute-

Cal Land Development Corp. v. Satherf 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980).
As previously stated by the Utah Supreme Court, the clear
language of Article 1, §11 and the substantive due process rights
embodied therein guarantee access to the courts and a judicial
procedure that is based on fairness and equality.

Berry v. Beech

Aircraft Corp. . 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) .

The factors set

13

forth in Westinghouse reflect this same concern for equality in the
court's consideration of each parties' conduct in relation to
judicial delays.
actions

of

The trial court's single minded focus upon the

the

Plaintiffs

arbitrarily

conflicts

with

the

Westinghouse directive and the due process considerations embodied
in Section 11.

Therefore, the trial court's decision to dismiss

Plaintiffs' case constitutes an arbitrary decision rendered in
violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional due process rights.

The

trial court's decision, therefore, should be reversed and remanded.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' ACTION WHEN THE COURT
FAILED TO APPLY THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD
The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice without specifically considering necessary elements in
making that decision. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
fail to address any of the specific requirements the trial court
must consider in acting upon the issue.

The court ignored the

relevant factors which are elemental to the ruling of dismissal,
which are set forth in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and interpreted in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul Larsen
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).

The Westinghouse

elements are set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah
App. 1989), as follows:
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced
against a higher priority: to "afford disputants an
opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them."
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 544 P.2d [876] at 879.
Thus, there is more to consider in determining if a
dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper than merely
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the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed. Id.
The factors which we consider may include the following:
(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each of
the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other
side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may
result from the dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean, 656
P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565
P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977). [Emphasis added].
A fair analysis of these criteria and the facts, especially the
Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich, R. 306, Addendum 3, compel this
Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal.
A.

Conduct of Both Parties
On June 9, 1993, the Court entered a Scheduling Order setting

the trial for January 4, 1994.

R. 92.

The Scheduling Order

required Plaintiffs to designate their expert witnesses by August
31, 1993 and lay witnesses by September 30, 1993. Id.

Plaintiffs

submitted their expert witness list on August 31, 1993, R. 98, and
lay witness list on September 30, 1993.

R. 103.

The Scheduling

Order required the Defendants to file their expert and lay witness
list on September 30, 1993. R. 92. Defendants failed to file any
list of witnesses.
In October, 1993, Plaintiffs conducted discovery in record
depositions, R.

105, served

Interrogatories and Requests for

Production of Documents on Defendants, R. 107, and prepared the
case for trial. In November, 1993, Plaintiffs moved to amend their
Complaint in order to simplify and focus the issues.

At the

November 30, 1993 Pretrial Hearing, Judge Rokich continued the
trial at the request of the Defendants and with the consent of the
15

parties, agreeing that this was the proper determination. R. 3067, Addendum 3.

In December, 1993, Plaintiffs answered Defendants'

Second Set of Interrogatories.

R. 175.

Defendants failed to participate in the action by failing to
designate their witnesses or answer Plaintiffs' discovery. At the
status hearing in September, 1994, both parties and Judge Rokich
agreed to continue the status hearing without date after Defendants
indicated a likely change of counsel. On learning that a change of
counsel was anticipated, Judge Rokich felt ". . . i t would be
inappropriate

to

enter

a

scheduling

order

when

counsel

for

Defendants was changing." Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich, ^ 6,
R. 306, Addendum 3.

Judge Rokich did not intend to schedule the

case for trial until substitute counsel for Defendants had been
designated.

Id.

Plaintiffs' counsel relied on Judge Rokich's

scheduling rulings and awaited the notice of appearance of new
counsel.
Defendants' new counsel simultaneously filed a Notice of
Appearance of Counsel and a Motion to Dismiss on June 2, 1995. The
filing of the Motion to Dismiss completely disregarded Judge
Rokich's rulings on scheduling.

The delay created between the

scheduling hearing in September, 1994, and the May, 1995, Motion to
Dismiss was entirely due to the Defendants' failure to name
substitute counsel. Plaintiffs' reliance on Judge Rokich's rulings
was reasonable.

The Plaintiffs should not loose their cause of

action because they relied on the rulings of the court.

The

dismissal penalizes Plaintiffs for complying with Judge Rokich's
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ruling to allow the entry of new counsel before entering a
scheduling order. This Court should defer to the rulings of Judge
Rokich to allow the scheduling order to be entered and give the
parties their day in court.
The Supreme Court disfavors the ambush approach of Defendants
in their filing of the Motion to Dismiss. In Johnson v. Firebrand,
Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1977), the Court stated:
The conduct of the parties cannot be readily
explained, and in view of the fact that new counsel
caused the case to be activated, it seems that the court
abused its discretion in dismissing the case on a motion
to dismiss that was filed at the same time as the answer.
Although Plaintiffs' case has been pending for some time, the
latest delay was directly caused by Defendants' failure to name
replacement
ruling,

counsel.

Plaintiffs

In following Judge Rokich's scheduling
could

not

move

the

case

forward

until

Defendants' replacement counsel had been named. As a result, it is
an abuse of discretion for the court to dismiss Plaintiffs' cause
of action when the motion to dismiss was filed at the same time as
the Notice of Appearance of Counsel.
Defendants

caused

the delay.

They

failed

to designate

witnesses and failed to participate in discovery by failing to
answer Plaintiffs' discovery requests. They requested the trial be
continued.

They failed to replace their counsel for several

months. When Defendants finally named substitute counsel, he filed
the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute in defiance of Judge
Rokich's ruling. R. 305-6. The conduct of Defendants was to delay
and to deceive. The conduct of the Plaintiffs was to cooperate and
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to move the case forward.

The case should not be dismissed when

virtually every action to move the case forward was accomplished by
the Plaintiffs.
B.

The Opportunity of Each Party to Move the Case Forward
Both parties had the opportunity to move the case forward.

Only Plaintiffs, however, actually moved the case forward by
conducting

discovery,

designating

expert

and

lay witnesses,

responding to Defendants7 discovery, taking records depositions,
issuing Subpoenas Duces Tecum, and focusing the issues with a
Motion

to

Amend

the

Complaint.

Defendants

had

the

same

opportunity, but failed to name witnesses or respond to Plaintiffs'
discovery. In fact, it appears that Defendants intentionally tried
to delay

the proceedings by

seeking

to continue

the trial,

substitute counsel, obtaining a ruling from Judge Rokich that the
case would not proceed until new counsel was designated, waiting
nine months to name replacement counsel, and filing a Motion to
Dismiss at the same time as replacement counsel was named.

Both

parties had the opportunity to go forward, but only Plaintiffs
moved the case forward, while Defendants sought only to delay.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when all
litigants have the power to pursue and advance an action, it is
error to dismiss with prejudice the claim of either party.
Court stated:
. . . [T]his court has . . . held that where all of the
litigants had power to obtain relief and failed to do so,
it is error to dismiss with prejudice. None of the
defendants requested a re-setting of either a pre-trial
conference or trial as was mandated by the court
18

The

previously when the pre-trial was suspended by reason of
settlement negotiations.
Utah

Oil

Co. v.

Harris,

565

P.2d

1135,

1137

(Utah

1977).

Defendants did not request a pretrial conference or trial, but
sought to continue the trial and suspend the proceedings in order
to name substitute counsel.

Since the parties had the power to

obtain relief, it was error to dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action
with prejudice.
The complaining party's lack of diligence in moving the case
forward also precludes the dismissal.
stated

in

Westinghouse

Electric

The Utah Supreme Court

Supply

v.

Paul

W.

Larsen

Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1977):
[W] e are not impressed that the defendants
themselves were overly diligent or manifest any
particular haste in getting the pretrial discovery
procedures completed and on with the trial.
The Supreme Court also stated:
. . . The important fact is that the defendant himself
did nothing to move the case forward, but appears to have
been quite contented to let it lie dormant until it was
reactivated by the plaintiff.
In accord with the view of the trial court, we are
not impressed with either fairness or propriety in one
party sitting silently by for a long period of time, then
attempting to blame the other party for the delay . . . .
Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324
(1980) .
[I]t is obvious that plaintiffs' lack of
diligence in prosecuting over 16 months was reasonably
excusable in light of the settlement efforts and had
defendants been anxious to proceed they need only have
taken such affirmative step themselves.
Also, no
prejudice to defendants' position is evident while
serious injustice may well exist as result of the
dismissal.
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Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977).

The

Plaintiffs' delay is reasonably excusable in light of Defendants'
continuance of the trial, their representation that substitute
counsel would be named and Judge Rokich's ruling that no action be
taken in the case until replacement counsel is named. Affidavit of
Judge Rokich, 1 6, R. 307. The delay of Defendants in continuing
the trial and naming substitute counsel caused an eighteen month
delay in the proceedings, November 30, 1993 to May, 1995.

If

Defendants were so intent on moving the case forward, they could
have taken affirmative steps themselves by requesting a trial
setting, designating witnesses, and answering discovery.

Because

the Defendants failed to take any constructive step to advance the
case

forward,

it was

error

for the

trial

court

to dismiss

Plaintiffs' action with prejudice.
Defendants had the opportunity to move the case forward. They
might not have moved to strike the January 4, 1994 trial date at
the November 30, 1993 pretrial.

They might have named their

substitute counsel immediately instead of waiting nine months, from
the scheduling conference in September, 1994 until filing the
Motion to Dismiss in May, 1995.

Defendants might easily have

responded to the outstanding discovery instead of prolonging the
proceedings by neglecting to respond.

Defendants might have

designated their witnesses and prepared for trial.

They did not.

Defendants agreed to or exclusively caused an eighteen month delay
between November, 1993, when the trial date was stricken, and May,
1995, when Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss. Defendants were
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content to allow time to pass and then use the passage of time to
condemn the Plaintiffs and seek a dismissal.
C.

What Each Party Did to Move the Case Forward
Plaintiffs moved this case forward by naming their witnesses,

issuing Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents,
answering

Defendants'

Interrogatories,

conducting

records

depositions, serving Subpoenas Duces Tecum, and seeking to amend
the Complaint. Defendants took no steps to name their witnesses or
respond to Plaintiffs' discovery. Defendants failed to name their
substitute counsel as promised at the September, 1994 status
conference until the Motion to Dismiss was filed in May, 1995.
With the exception of the deposition of Michael Strand, Plaintiffs
were prepared to try the case.

Plaintiffs have documentation of

Defendants' malpractice, for which sanctions were imposed by the
State Division of Licensing.

That documentation does not grow

stale, as the Defendants allege, nor do the records of the State
relating to its sanction and suspension of Defendants for their
acts.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is error to
dismiss an action with prejudice when all litigants had the
opportunity to move the case forward but failed to do so. Utah Oil
Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137

(Utah 1977); Westincrhouse

Electric Supply v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876,
879 (Utah 1977); Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d
1323, 1324 (1980) . In Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah
2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959), the case was dormant from June 5,
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1950 until May 28, 1958, when a motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution was filed.

The Court stated:

. . . Since any party to this action could have
obtained the relief to which it was entitled at any time
it wanted but both parties chose to dally for a number of
years, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to
grant respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice.
See also, Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) .
Since both parties had an opportunity to move the case forward, it
is an abuse of discretion for this action to be dismissed with
prejudice.
When the court makes a ruling, it is reasonable for the
parties to rely on that ruling without risking a dismissal of their
claims.

In Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah 1977), the

Supreme Court set aside a dismissal for failure to prosecute
because the parties failed to receive notice of the new trial date.
The Court stated:
We conclude, after a review of the entire record in
this matter, including the District Court's failure to
notify the attorneys of the new trial date after the
hearing on December 15, 1975, that it was an abuse of
discretion to order a dismissal of this action for
failure to prosecute when measured by the principles
announced in Westinghouse v. Larsen, . . . .
In the case at bar, the court did not contribute to the delay, but
ruled

that

no

further

proceedings

Defendants named their new counsel.

would

take

place

before

Plaintiffs complied with the

court's ruling and took no further action until Defendants named
their counsel.

When naming their attorney, Defendants also filed

the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The grant of that
motion constitutes an abuse of discretion under the totality of the
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circumstances, the justifiable excuse of Plaintiffs, and the
principles set forth in Westinghouse.
D.

What Difficulty or Prejudice was Caused to Defendants
Defendants7

only

allegation

of

difficulty

or

prejudice

resulting from the delay in bringing this action to trial is that
the issues

are

"stale" and

that witnesses

cannot be found.

Defendants have never explained the actual effect, if any, of their
conclusion that the issues were "stale".
never named

the witnesses

they

Likewise, Defendants

sought

but

could

not

find.

Defendants have failed to disclose any of their witnesses, despite
the court order requiring disclosure.

Their claim that some

witnesses cannot be found, therefore, seems particularly hollow.
The

difficulty

or

prejudice

alleged

by

Defendants

is

unsubstantiated and without foundation. Defendants have simply not
been prejudiced or injured as a result of any delays which are, in
fact, a direct result of the Defendants' own acts.
The Utah Supreme Court in Klincrer v. Kicrhtly. 791 P. 2d 868
Utah 1990), analyzed the issue of staleness and balanced it against
the potential prejudice to the parties.

The Court stated:

as signor on the survey certificate he is
responsible for its content, is still actively engaged in
the practice of surveying, and is available for
testimony.
Utilizing the balancing test and being conscious of
the purposes of the statute of limitations, we hold that
under the facts of this case the evidence is not so stale
or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to defendants of
having their claim barred by the statute of limitations.
Id. at 872.

See also, Sevey v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629
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(Utah 1995) . While this case admittedly deals with the statute of
limitations, its analysis of the "staleness" issue is useful.
Those responsible for the accounting product are still actively
involved in the accounting industry and are available to testify.
When this Court compares the dismissal's prejudicial effect on
Plaintiffs in contrast to the hardship or prejudice to Defendants,
the Plaintiffs' claim is not so stale and remote as to justify the
dismissal.
E.

Whether Injustice will Result from the Dismissal
The Utah Supreme Court called the last consideration in the

Westincrhouse test the "most important": whether injustice may
result from the dismissal. Plaintiffs clearly suffer injustice as
a result of the Court's decision.
valuable

cause of

action which

Plaintiffs have a valid and
is lost with

the dismissal.

Plaintiffs will never have their day in court to air their
grievances nor recover damages for the intentional malpractice of
Defendants.

Plaintiffs are prejudiced because they reasonably

relied, to their detriment, on the rulings of Judge Rokich and the
agreements of the Defendants and the Court to continue the case
without a trial setting.

Plaintiffs are also prejudiced because

they lose their substantial investment of time and attorney's fees
in this cause of action and their injuries caused at the hands of
Defendants' malpractice will go uncompensated.
Injustice will result not only to Plaintiffs, who lose a sound
and valuable cause of action, but also to Plaintiffs' counsel, who
faces a claim of malpractice due to the dismissal.
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Was it

malpractice for Plaintiff's counsel to rely on the rulings of Judge
Rokich and agreements with Defendants to continue the case without
a trial setting?
rely

on

the

Was it unreasonable for Plaintiffs' counsel to

representations

that

Defense

counsel

would

be

substituted and that until the substitution, it was inappropriate
to set a trial date?

Was it a breach of the standard of care for

Plaintiff's counsel to fail to schedule the out of town deposition
of Michael Strand before Defendants had named the attorney who
would represent them at trial?

In a time when the Courts and the

Bar stress the need for civility between the parties, is it
unreasonable for Plaintiffs' counsel to seek to accommodate Defense
counsel in relation to the scheduling?

The Court's dismissal of

this action flies in the face of civility and cooperation.

And

now, because of new counsel and a new court, Plaintiffs may loose
their cause of action because their counsel relied on those
policies and the expressed rulings of Judge Rokich.

This is

unfair, a harsh result without warning, and contrary to the
principles of civility and judicial discretion.
The law abhors a forfeiture. The Utah Supreme Court in Madsen
v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44 (Utah 1983), has stated:
. . . The undesirability of such a result is well-stated
by the legal maxim that "the law abhors forfeiture."
E.g., SAS Partnership v. Schafer, Mont., 653 P.2d 834,
837 (1982); Eisele v. Kowal, 11 Ariz. App. 468, 471, 465
P.2d 605, 608 (1970).
Because forfeitures are usually harsh, we have
disfavored them in cases where the notice to the buyer of
the impending forfeiture is uncertain as to the
performance demanded, or misleads the buyer into thinking
that the forfeiture provision will not be strictly
enforced. See First Security Bank v. Maxwell, Utah, 659
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P.2d 1078 (1983) ; Grow v. Marwick Development. Inc. ,
Utah, 621 P.2d 1249 (1980) . Cf.
Wincrets, Inc. v.
Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972) (terms of
the forfeiture provision must be clear and unambiguous).
The decision of the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs7 Complaint,
with prejudice, constitutes a forfeiture without reasonable notice.
Similar to the situation in Madsen, Plaintiffs7 counsel did not
know of an impending risk of dismissal or forfeiture of the cause
of action because of the rulings of Judge Rokich and the agreements
between the parties and the Court.

Plaintiffs were active in

preparing for trial and had all the preparations completed with the
exception of the deposition of Michael Strand and the documents
requested from Defendants.
Forfeitures
appropriate

are

that

harsh.

short

of

Dismissals
dismissing

the

are

harsh.

action

It is

completely,

especially in light of the injustice to Plaintiffs and their
counsel, that the trial court consider other options to move the
case

forward

difficulty.

and

remedy

Defendants7

alleged

prejudice

and

The trial court could have set a strict schedule and

expedited the trial. The court could have ordered that Plaintiffs
bear the expense of locating witnesses which Defendants claim are
"lost".

But in light of Judge Rokich7s ruling and the agreements

of the parties, totally dismissing Plaintiffs7

Complaint with

prejudice is unduly harsh and an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiffs simply seek to have this Court recognize and
embrace the higher priority in the use of its discretion, to afford
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between
them. Justice requires that the Court reinstate Plaintiffs7 cause
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of action and allow the case to be heard on the merits.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Westincrhouse Electric Supply
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1977):
. . . it is indeed commendable to handle cases with
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in order
to keep them up to date. But it is even more important
to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard
and to do justice between them. In conformity with that
principle the courts generally tend to favor granting
relief from default judgment where there is any
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to
give proper weight to the higher priority; and that under
the circumstances described herein, the order of
dismissal (with prejudice) was an abuse of discretion.
[Emphasis added].
Although the trial court sought to relieve its calendar of an old
case, it ignored the previous rulings of the court, the relative
positions of the parties, the delay caused by Defendants, and the
prejudice wrought on Plaintiffs by dismissing their cause of
action.

The record reflects no prejudice or injustice which

reversing the dismissal would impose on Defendants.

The trial

court has failed to give the proper weight to the higher priority
of allowing cases to be heard and determined on their merits. The
dismissal, therefore, should be overturned.
CONCLUSION
Due process is a constitutionally guaranteed protection,
affording not only notice and an opportunity for hearing, but also
requiring judges to consider relevant factors in reaching their
decisions, to protect against arbitrary and capricious decisions
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that abuse discretion.

The trial court failed to consider the

Westinghouse factors in making its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs'
cause

of

action

with

prejudice, but

focused

exclusively

on

Plaintiffs' actions. The failure to consider the relevant factors
in reaching a decision is an abuse of discretion. Having failed to
consider the relevant factors in making its decision, the trial
court violated Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Based
on that violation, the case should be reversed and remanded to the
trial court.
The Westinghouse requirements must be considered by the court
before ruling on a motion to dismiss.
considerations
11

In addition to the five

set forth in Westinghouse, it also requires a

justifiable excuse11 for the delay. Plaintiffs' justification for

the delay is Defendants' request to continue the trial and Judge
Rokich's ruling that no action would be taken in relation to the
case until Defendants' substitute counsel was named, coupled with
Defendants' nine month delay in naming that counsel. Defendants,
therefore, directly caused or consented to delays of over eighteen
months. The Defendants' actions constitute the justifiable excuse
for the actions of Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs

adhered

to

designating its witnesses.

the

court's

scheduling

order

by

Defendants never named any witnesses.

Plaintiffs conducted discovery, held records depositions, issued
subpoenas duces tecum, and filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to
move the case forward.

Defendants did nothing to move the case

forward and now complain of the delay they created.
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The totality

of the circumstances justify the reversal of the dismissal and
remand to the trial court.
DATED this

£$

day of April, 1996.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple #330,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169, postage prepaid, this $0
of April, 1996.
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ADDENDUM 1
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice

MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants Leland Martineau and
Martineau & Company
139 East South Temple, #330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Fax: (801) 531-0444

FtttBBlST8tCTG888T
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 3 1995
SAL! tAKcdQti&TY
By

^
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND and LOIS L.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

STRAND,

PREJUDICE
Plaintiffs,

v.

:

Civil No. 810905200-CV

:

Judge William B. Bohling

LELAND MARTINEAU, et al.
Defendants.
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concurrentiy entered herewith
and good cause appearing, now, therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss with prejudice and on the merits be and the same is hereby granted and the aboveentitled action, including the Amended Complaint and all causes of action, be and the same are

0 0 0 32:

hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees,
court costs and expenses.
Plaintiffs Motions to Strike Answer and Enter Default Judgment and to Strike the
Affidavit of Leland Martineau are hereby denied.

Octets
DATED this < J d a y of Auguat, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable William B. Bohling
District Court Judge
•
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ralph C. Petty
Attorneys for Defendants

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, this ^ f

day of August, 1995, postage prepaid, and re-

served following consideration of Plaintiffs' objections on the following:
Ralph C. Petty
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City UT 84111

I;

lh'M'£^^

34sbmid 6490

*1 0 0 3 '2 3

ADDENDUM 2
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants Leland Martineau and
Martineau & Company
139 East South Temple, #330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Fax: (801) 531-0444

HLEDBlS1BtCTC8»RT
TWid Judicial District

OCT 2 3 1995
By — — — • *

Iy

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND and LOIS L.
STRAND,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

Civil No. 810905200-CV

:

Judge William B. Bohling

Plaintiffs,
v.
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al.
Defendants.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike
Answer and Enter Default Judgment and to Strike Affidavit of Leland Martineau came on for
hearing before the above-entitled court pursuant to notice before the Honorable William B.
Bohling at his courtroom in Salt Lake City, Utah on Monday, August 14, 1995 with Ralph C.
Petty appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs and Michael L. Deamer appearing on behalf of

a oo31 ?

Defendants and the court having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed the
memorandums of law and affidavits and being fully advised in the premises, now enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs' action was originally filed in June of 1981. Plaintiffs' Complaint has

been amended at least once but the matter is not presently certified for trial nor has the court
set a date for trial.
2.

Except for status conferences, the last action taken in this matter was in

December of 1993.
3.

Plaintiffs claim that they have outstanding discovery requests filed in

approximately October of 1993 which Defendants deny. Plaintiffs have not filed a motion to
compel discovery or taken any other action regarding the outstanding discovery requests.
4.

Defendants have denied the material allegations of Plaintiffs' Amended

Complaint by Affidavit and there has been no counter-affidavit filed by Plaintiffs in response
thereto.
5.

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to go forward with the litigation and certify

the matter for trial within a reasonable period of time.
6.

Plaintiff Michael Strand is presently in a Texas penitentiary and will be for a few

more years and, therefore, is unable to be present for any trial of the above-entitled matter.
7.

It appears to the court that the issues are stale, witnesses cannot be identified,

and it would be in the best interest of justice to dismiss the above-entitled action with prejudice
on the merits under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2

A

r. f\ a •* c

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to prosecute the above-entitled action with

due diligence and without unusual or unreasonable delay.
2.

Plaintiffs have not, with reasonable diligence, pursued their outstanding

discovery requests.
3.

The Affidavit of Leland Martineau set forth upon information and belief is

sufficient under Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and shall not be stricken.
4.

Plaintiffs' failure to pursue litigation that has been pending for over 14 years

with no action except for status conferences taken on the matter since December of 1993 is
sufficient basis for dismissal of the above-entitled action with prejudice on the merits, pursuant
to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

No attorneys' fees and costs are awarded.

6.

Defendants' Motion should be granted and Plaintiffs' Motions denied.

Oc43u
DATED this C£_ day of Augustr 1995.
COURT:

Honorable William B. Bohling
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ralph C. Petty
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this ^ 3 ^ ~ a y of August, 1995, postage prepaid,
and re-served following consideration of Plaintiffs'objections on the following:
Ralph C. Petty
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City UT 84111
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34sbmld.6489
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ADDENDUM 3
Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich
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Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686

1995

FILED
n •^ v
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T R I c t ^ ^ H T OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL W. STRAND, et al. ,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A, ROKICH
IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO
SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND
REINSTATE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION

v.
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. ,
Defendants.

Case No. 810905200CV
Judge William 3. Bohling

County of Tooele

)

State of Utah

) ss
}

John A, Rokich, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
1.

Affiant is a member of the Utah Bar in good standing.

2.

Affiant is familiar with and has personal knowledge of the

statements set forth in this Affidavit.
3.

Affiant was the judge assigned to the above entitled

matter when it came before Affiant pursuant

to a scheduling

conference, on September 17, 1994.
4.

Affiant is competent to testify, and if called to testify,

his testimony would establish the facts averred in this Affidavit.
5.

At the September 17, 1994 scheduling conference between

the Court and the above mentioned parties, Defendants' counsel,
Roger Sandack, indicated that he would be replaced by subsequent
counsel and would not be the attorney representing the defendants

a ft a s n fi

at the time of trial.
6,

Based on the disclosures of Mr. Sandack, and the consent

of Mr. Petty, Affiant determined that it would be inappropriate to
enter a scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was changing.
Affiant intended to set a schedule for the completion of this
action after Defendants' new counsel had been designated. Affiant
intended to take no further action in relation to this case until
substitute counsel for Defendants was designated.
7.

A trial had been scheduled in this case for January, 1994.

At a pretrial hearing for the trial, the parties, with Affiant's
consent, agreed to continue the trial, without date.
DATED this

c\ P

day of August, 1995.
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\Johri. A. Rokich

1995.

Subscribed and sworn before me this
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OiO day of August,
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Notary Publi<f/ residina at
Tooele, Utah /

My^ommission Expires:
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April 1,1997
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I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple # 330,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this ,)£f

day of

August, 1 9 9 5 .
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ADDENDUM 4
Notice of Appeal

Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Plaintiff
215 South State, # 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-8900
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Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND, et al.,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
v.
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. ,
Defendants.

Case No. 810905200CV
Judge William B. Bohling

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, through
its attorneys appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment
of Judge William B. Bohling, entered in this matter on October 23,
1995.
DATED this

day of November, 1995.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple #330,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169, postage prepaid, this
of November, 1995.

day

